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                            OPINION 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation and its parent company, Amerada 
Hess 
Corporation (collectively "HOVIC") sued Zurich Insurance Company seeking 
coverage 
under an insurance policy for injuries some workers suffered in an 
explosion at HOVIC's 
St. Croix oil refinery.  Zurich denied coverage under the policy it had 
issued to HOVIC, 
and HOVIC eventually settled the claims that the injured employees had 
filed against 
their employer.  Thereafter, HOVIC sued Zurich in an attempt to recover 
under its 
insurance policy.   The district court concluded that HOVIC's claim was 
unambiguously 
excluded from coverage under Zurich's policy, and granted Zurich's motion 
for summary 
judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse.  
 
                            I. FACTS 
 
     In 1991, HOVIC began constructing an addition to an existing oil 
refinery on the 
island of St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands.  This involved the 
construction of a 
Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ("FCCU"), also known as a "cat cracker." As 
the name 
suggests, the unit was to be used in the "cracking" phase of the refinery 
process.  HOVIC 
contracted with Zurich Insurance Company to provide insurance coverage for 
the FCCU 
construction project.   The insurance contract was entitled, "Hess Oil 
Virgin Islands 
Corporation (HOVIC) Primary General/Third Party Liability Policy, Fluid 
Catalytic 
Cracking (FCCU Project) and Related Activities."  App.  at 242.   
             A. The Terms of The Insurance Contract 
     The insurance contract contains both general terms and conditions and 
specific 
endorsements.  The general terms and conditions set forth the basic 
coverage as explained 
in Articles 1 through 9 of the policy.  The attached endorsements address 
special 
situations in which coverage may be limited or excluded, for example, 
"Nuclear Energy 
Liability Exclusion Endorsement" or "Completed Operations/Products 
Liability 
Extension" and qualifies some of the terms and conditions in Articles 1 
through 9.   
     Pursuant to the general terms of the policy, in exchange for an 
annual premium of 
$1 million, Zurich agreed to pay HOVIC for "all sums which [HOVIC] shall 
be legally 
obligated to pay as damages... on account of personal injuries, including 
death... caused 
by or arising out of each occurrence during the policy period...."  App.  
at 246.  An 
"occurrence" is defined as: "...an accident... which results in bodily 
injury or property 
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of [the 
insured]."  App.  at 252.  
The policy offered $2 million in coverage per occurrence, and included: 
 
       the total sum [that] the insured pays or becomes obligated to pay 
       by reason of Personal Injury... either through adjudication or 
       compromise, and shall also include hospital, medical and funeral  
       charges and all sums paid as salaries, wages, compensation, fees, 
       charges, and law costs, premiums on attachment or appeal bonds, 
       interest, expenses for doctors, lawyers, nurses and investigators 
       of claims and persons, and for litigation, settlement adjustment 
       and investigation of claims and suits which are paid as a 
       consequence of any loss occurrence covered hereunder...   
 
App. At 253-54.  The general terms of the policy also required HOVIC to 
notify Zurich of 
an occurrence "as soon as practicable." The policy stated: 
       Whenever the Insured's manager of insurance administration has 
       information from which he may reasonably conclude that a loss 
       occurrence covered hereunder is likely to involve this policy... 
       notice shall be sent as soon as practicable to the Insurer.   
        
        
App.  at 254.  
     The "Seepage, Pollution and Contamination Clause" at issue here is 
one of 14 
endorsements that specifically limit or exclude coverage under the general 
terms and 
conditions of the policy.   That endorsement (also referred to as 
"Endorsement 2") 
specifically provides as follows: 
[t]his insurance does not cover any liability for: 
       Personal Injury or Property Damage arising out of the discharge, 
       dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, 
       alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials or 
       other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the 
       atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this 
       exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal release or 
       escape meets all of the following conditions: 
        
            a.   The discharge, dispersal, release or escape must be 
neither 
            expected nor intended by [HOVIC], and 
            b.   The inception of the discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape 
            must take place during the policy period, and 
            c.   The discharge, dispersal, release or escape must not 
            continue for more than six days, and 
            d.   The discharge, dispersal, release or escape must be 
            reported to the insurer within 30 days from the inception 
            of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape.   
        
App. 262. 
                       B. The Explosion. 
     On August 9, 1993,  a hose from a delivery tank truck burst while 
catalyst was 
being pumped into the FCCU, and catalyst sprayed out for about five to ten 
minutes.  
Despite the short duration of the discharge, some workers employed by the 
subcontractor 
at the FCCU were directly exposed to the catalyst.  A short time later, 
some of them 
began complaining of various ailments including sore throat, chest 
irritation, and 
vomiting of blood.  The foreman was allegedly notified of the incident but 
no one notified 
Zurich at that time.  Similarly, HOVIC did not receive any formal 
complaints or requests 
for compensation from the exposed workers.    
     On October 24, 1993, over two months after the accident, 11 workers 
who had 
been exposed sued HOVIC. alleging physical injuries due to their exposure 
to the 
catalyst.  When one of the original plaintiffs died, his heirs brought a 
second suit on 
behalf of his estate.  Except for the allegations relating to the death of 
the one worker, the 
two complaints were virtually identical.  On November 8, 1993, three days 
after it was 
served with the first complaint, and again on November 10, 1993, HOVIC 
notified Zurich 
of the lawsuits and requested coverage.  That notice was more than 90 days 
after the 
incident that caused the injuries.  
     By letters dated October 4, 1994 and May 30, 1995, Zurich denied 
coverage.   The 
denial was premised on the third and fourth conditions of Endorsement No. 
2.  
Specifically, Zurich asserted that the exposure to the catalyst continued 
for less than six 
days, and HOVIC had failed to report the burst hose incident within thirty 
days from the 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of the catalyst. 
            C. Settlement of the Underlying Lawsuits 
     On April 28, 1997, HOVIC settled the pending lawsuits for up to $1.6 
million.  
Under the terms of the agreement, HOVIC paid $160,000 in cash from its own 
funds and 
agreed to file suit against Zurich to force it to pay the remaining $1.44 
million under the 
insurance contract. If HOVIC prevails in the insurance coverage 
litigation, the agreement 
requires HOVIC to pay plaintiffs the remainder of the $1.6 million 
settlement.  If HOVIC 
recovers  more than $1.44 million, it will first recover the $160,000 
already paid to the 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs will receive the balance of the recovery up to 
$1.44 million.  If 
the recovery exceeds $1.44 million, the amount above that figure is to be 
split into two 
equal shares with one share going to HOVIC, and the remaining share being 
divided 
equally among the various plaintiffs. 
     Pursuant to that agreement, HOVIC filed this declaratory judgment 
action against 
Zurich in 1997 in the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands.  
The individual 
claimants thereafter intervened as plaintiffs.  After limited discovery, 
HOVIC and Zurich 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Zurich argued that the 
pollution exclusion 
provision  precluded coverage, and that  HOVIC could not satisfy any of 
the conditions 
that would prevent that exclusion from operating including the requirement 
of notification 
within 30 days of the "occurrence."  Zurich also argued that, even if it 
were liable under 
the policy, its exposure was limited to the $160,000 HOVIC paid to settle 
the claim, and 
not the conditional amount of $1.44 million that HOVIC was seeking under 
the settlement 
agreement. 
     In HOVIC's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, HOVIC argued 
that the 
pollution exclusion provision did not apply because the injury to the 
workers was  
precisely the type of risk covered by Zurich's FCCU Construction Project 
Policy as an 
"occurrence."  HOVIC also argued that it notified Zurich promptly under 
the general 
terms of the insurance contract and that any delay in notification was 
irrelevant because 
Zurich was not prejudiced by the timing of the notice.  Finally, HOVIC 
argued that 
Zurich was liable under the policy for the full amount of the workers' 
injuries, and that 
the policy recovery could not be capped at $160,000 given a valid two-
tiered settlement.   
     The district court granted Zurich's motion for summary judgment, and 
denied 
HOVIC's motion for partial summary judgment; and this appeal followed.   
            II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
     The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1332. We 
have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291 as this is an appeal of a final 
order of the district 
court.  We afford plenary review to a grant of summary judgment. Pearson 
v. Component 
Technology Corp., 247 F.3d 471,482 (3d Cir. 2001).  Our review of the 
district court's 
legal interpretation of the insurance contract is also plenary.  Patterson 
v. American 
Bosch Corp., 914 F.2d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 1990). 
                        III. DISCUSSION 
     HOVIC insists that it was paying a premium of $1 million per year to 
insure 
against just this type of accident, that it is unreasonable to interpret 
its policy with Zurich 
in a manner that excludes coverage for the very risk it was attempting to 
cover, and that 
the language of the policy does not support reading such a sweeping 
exclusion into an 
endorsement to its general risk policy.   
     HOVIC argues that the conflict between the coverage afforded under 
the general 
terms and conditions of the policy on the one hand, and the pollution 
exclusion in 
Endorsement No. 2 on the other hand, creates an ambiguity.  HOVIC asks us 
to resolve 
this ambiguity in favor of coverage arguing that this policy was intended 
to exclude only 
the cost of traditional environmental "spills" or discharges one normally 
associates with 
environmental discharge.  Under HOVIC's interpretation, such costs are 
excluded under 
the Endorsement unless the four conditions contained therein are 
satisfied.  In that event, 
according to HOVIC, the exclusion in the Endorsement does not operate, and 
Zurich is 
still obligated to pay for contamination and clean up.  Zurich insists 
upon a literal 
interpretation of the same language in Endorsement No. 2 and argues that 
it means that 
any injury resulting from any discharge is excluded from coverage. 
     HOVIC's interpretation is supported by both the regulatory history of 
the 
Endorsement and judicial interpretation of it.  Several courts have 
concluded that "the 
predominant motivation in drafting an exclusion for pollution-related 
injuries was the 
avoidance of the 'enormous expense and exposure resulting from the 
'explosion' of 
environmental litigation.'" American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 
72, 81 (Ill. 
1997) (emphasis in original, citations omitted); Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
774 So.2d 119, 
132 (La. 2000) (accepting that the pollution exclusion clause "was 
originally designed to 
exclude from coverage only that property and personal damage which 
resulted from 
traditional forms of pollution.").   
     However, other courts have interpreted such endorsements in a manner 
that is 
consistent with the position Zurich urges us to take here. Those courts 
have focused on 
the precise language of the exclusion clause itself, and have concluded 
that the exclusion 
has a much broader reach and excludes all injuries related to exposure to 
materials the 
policy defines as "pollutants." See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 
F.3d 895 (3d Cir. 
1997) (applying Pennsylvania law).  As the district court correctly noted 
here, "the source 
of the disagreement within the jurisprudence seems to lie in the fact that 
the language of 
the clause is 'quite specific' on its face, and yet a literal 
interpretation of that language 
results in an application of the clause which is 'quite broad.'" Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 12, citing 
American States v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 78 (Ill. 1997). 
     After analyzing the conflicting positions of  HOVIC and Zurich, the 
district court 
concluded that the interpretations offered by both were "compelling," and 
that the 
strength of each interpretation reflected the divergence of jurisprudence 
of the various 
courts that have interpreted this language. Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that Zurich's  
policy was unambiguous and enforced what it believed was a literal reading 
of its 
provisions.   In doing so, however, the court failed to realize that 
"conflicting 
interpretations of the policy is strongly indicative of th[is] policy's 
essential ambiguity."  
New Castle County v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA 174 
F.3d 338, 347 
(3d Cir. 1999).    
     The very fact that HOVIC and Zurich were able to offer conflicting, 
yet  
"compelling," interpretations establishes the essential ambiguity in this 
policy. Where 
"there is more than one reasonable reading of a policy provision ...that 
provision must be 
construed against the insurance company which has drafted it."  Buntin v. 
Continental 
Ins. Co., 583 F.2d 1201, 1207 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis supplied).  
Moreover, as we have 
previously stated in interpreting an insurance policy under Virgin Islands 
law, any 
ambiguity in an insurance policy is to be "construed against the insurer, 
and in a manner 
which is more favorable to coverage."  Id.   Thus, under Virgin Islands 
law, "[i]f the 
insured proffers a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term, then 
that term controls 
and the insured is entitled to judgment as a  matter of law so long as the 
undisputed facts 
fall within the purview of the meaning offered by the insured." In re Tutu 
Wells 
Contamination Litigation, 78 F.Supp 2d 456, 466 (D.V.I., 1999).   Here, 
there are no 
disputed material facts outside the interpretation offered by HOVIC, and 
we therefore 
hold that HOVIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
     In addition, we note that our conclusion that HOVIC is entitled to 
judgment as a 
matter of law is consistent with the reasonable expectations of these 
parties as evidenced 
by the language of the policy. See Oritani Savings and Loan Assoc., v 
Fidelity and 
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 989 F.2d 635 (3rd Cir. 1993) (applying New Jersey 
law).  In 
Oritani Savings and Loan we noted that insurance policies are to be 
interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations. Id., 
at 638.  After 
noting the problems that often arise from the technical nature of 
insurance policies we 
stated that, "[c]overage will be provided if policy language is 
'insufficiently clear to 
justify depriving the insured of [its] reasonable expectation that 
coverage would be 
provided'" (quoting Sparks v St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325, (1985)).  
"In most cases, 
'the language of the insurance policy will provide the best indication of 
the content of the 
parties' reasonable expectations.'" Medical Protective Company, 198 F.3d 
at 106 
(applying Pennsylvania law), citing Moessner, 121 F.3d at 903.  
     Here, Zurich's interpretation of Endorsement No.  2 would not only 
result in an 
application that "is 'quite broad,'" as the district court noted; it would 
result in an 
exclusion that would swallow the very coverage that Hess was paying for.  
As noted 
above, Endorsement No. 2 excludes coverage for injuries and damage 
resulting from the 
"discharge, . . . [of all toxic materials or irritants] . . .into or upon 
land, the atmosphere or 
any water course or body of water . . ."  unless certain conditions are 
satisfied.  
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "atmosphere" as including: 
"the whole 
mass of air surrounding the earth . . . the air of a given place or 
locality . . . ."  Thus, if the 
policy excludes damages for injury or loss resulting from discharges "into 
or upon the 
land," water, and air, there is precious little space where the insured 
risk might occur.   
Therefore, the interpretation that Zurich insists upon, and that the 
district court adopted, 
would have the practical effect of excluding coverage for all of HOVIC's 
business 
activities (assuming an injury due to "discharge," etc.) as any discharge 
would have to 
occur on land, or in the Earth's atmosphere.  Here, a hose burst, and 
toxic materials were 
released into the air (i.e. "atmosphere") thereby injuring some workers.  
We can not agree 
that HOVIC and Zurich intended to exclude such injuries under Endorsement 
No. 2 while 
affording coverage for liability resulting from industrial accidents on 
HOVIC's premises.  
HOVIC is, after all,  in the business of handling toxic materials. 
     Zurich attempts to counter this result by arguing that the HOVIC's 
policy resulted 
from involved negotiation between sophisticated parties who were well 
aware of the 
scope of coverage they were bargaining for.  However, HOVIC was paying for 
something 
more than the mere illusion of coverage.  Yet, under Zurich's 
interpretation, that is all 
HOVIC received for its $1 million per year premium. We do not believe that 
HOVIC, a 
company whose business involved handling and processing toxic materials, 
consciously 
negotiated an insurance policy with an annual premium of $1 million and 
intended to 
exclude damages resulting from all discharges of toxic materials anywhere 
on land, air or 
sea.  See Ducote v Koch Pipeline, 730 So. 2d 432, 436 (La. 1999) (applying 
Louisiana 
law the court stated: "An insurance policy should not be interpreted in an 
unreasonable or 
a strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond 
what is reasonably 
contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd result."). See 
also Dodson v St. 
Paul Insurance Co., 812 P.2d 372, 376 (Okla. 1991) (applying Oklahoma law, 
the court 
stated, "The construction of an insurance policy should be a natural and 
reasonable one, 
fairly constructed to effectuate its purpose, and viewed in the light of 
common sense so as 
not to bring about an absurd result.").  
     Moreover, HOVIC offered the testimony of Kevin Beebe, HOVIC's Manager 
of 
Corporate Insurance, who represented HOVIC when it purchased the Zurich 
policy, and 
John Talarico, HOVIC's Property & Claims Administrator.  They both stated 
that "it is 
Hess' belief and expectation that the [injuries at issue]  are covered 
under the policy."  
App.  at 472; 474.  Although, as Zurich notes, these statements do not 
necessarily 
constitute sufficient evidence to establish HOVIC's reasonable expectation 
as a matter of 
law, they are certainly consistent with the result reached by applying the 
principles of 
contract interpretation that must guide our analysis.   
     Furthermore, Zurich could have provided an endorsement that would 
have 
unambiguously achieved the exclusion that Zurich now maintains is 
accomplished by 
Endorsement No.  2. See  McKusick v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 329, 632 
N.W.2d 525 
(Mich. App. 2001).  The exclusion in McKusick stated: "[t]his insurance 
does not apply 
to: ... '[b]odily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the... 
discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants: ... which arises out 
of 'your work'...; 
or which arises out of 'your product.'"  Zurich could have similarly 
inserted language 
excluding injuries to workers resulting from the workers' exposure to 
pollutants while 
they are engaged in the normal course of the ordinary business of the 
insured.  We do not 
suggest that this precise language would necessarily remove all questions 
of coverage in 
accidents such as occurred here, but it would surely be a more precise way 
of expressing 
the intent that Zurich claims is embodied in Endorsement No.  2 of  this 
insurance policy.  
Accordingly, we hold that injuries to the individual workers at HOVIC's 
facility are 
covered as a matter of law, and the district court erred in denying 
HOVIC's motion for 
summary judgment. 
        C.  Extent of Coverage of Two-Tiered Settlement 
     We believe that the district court also contravened Virgin Islands 
law in limiting 
Zurich's exposure to the amount defined by the first tier of HOVIC's 
settlement 
agreement.  See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Treister, 794 F.Supp. 560 (D.V.I. 
1992).  In Treister, 
an insurer argued that it should not be liable to the insured for the 
entire amount of a 
settlement because the insured had supposedly colluded with the plaintiff 
and would 
suffer no personal loss since his personal liability was limited to the 
amount the court 
would determine the insurer owed in a declaratory judgment action.  Id. at 
573.  The court 
rejected this argument.  The court held that once the insurer declined 
coverage, the 
insured "had the right to enter into a reasonable settlement with the 
[plaintiff], and to 
recover, within policy limits, the amount of that settlement" from the 
insurer.  Id. at 573- 
74.  Moreover, because the settlement agreement was reasonable, the court 
entered a 
declaratory judgment directing the insurer to cover the entire amount 
negotiated by the 
insured and the plaintiffs at settlement.  
     Here,  the district court expressly declined to follow Treister.  
Rather, the court 
distinguished it by focusing upon the "legally obligated to pay" provision 
in the Treister 
policy. Zurich's policy contains the same language.  HOVIC's policy with 
Zurich 
requires the latter to pay "all sums which [HOVIC] shall be legally 
obligated to pay... 
[whether incurred through] adjudication or compromise."  App.  at 246.  
Zurich argues 
that since HOVIC is only legally obligated to pay the first tier of the 
settlement, Zurich's 
liability is limited accordingly.  This argument was also expressly 
rejected in In re Tutu 
Water Wells Contamination Litig., 78 F.  Supp. 2d 423 (D.V.I. 1999).   
Tutu Water Wells 
concerned a coverage dispute arising out of the insurer's refusal to  
provide coverage, 
defend or indemnify the insured against numerous environmental actions 
following 
gasoline leakage into the surrounding water wells.  There, however, the 
court held that the 
holding in Treister was consistent with the common law as understood 
throughout the 
United States, and declined to follow the district court's subsequent 
decision here to the 
contrary. The court reasoned that "[a]llowing an insurer, after it 
abandoned its duties 
under the insurance agreement, to thereafter assert as a defense the 
language of the very 
contract it refused to honor would lead to an unjust result inconsistent 
with the principles 
of Virgin Islands law."  Id. at 431.  We agree. Moreover, a contrary 
holding would 
encourage insurers to decline coverage they are legally obligated to 
provide in the hopes 
of capping any future liability to the amount of any settlement that the 
insured may reach 
with the injured claimant.  Where an insured has recovered a judgment 
against an insurer 
after settling underlying claims, the insured is legally obligated to pay 
the injured parties 
pursuant to the terms of any settlement agreement, and the insurer remains 
liable to the 
insured up to the policy limits where it has undertaken to pay amounts the 
insured is 
obligated to pay "by adjudication or compromise." 
                        III. CONCLUSION 
     For the above reasons, we hold that the district court erred in 
granting summary 
judgment to Zurich based upon Endorsement No.  2,  and in limiting 
Zurich's exposure to 
the amount HOVIC has paid pursuant to the first tier of its settlement 
agreement with 
claimants.  We will therefore reverse the order of the district court, and 
remand with 
instructions that the district court enter judgment for HOVIC pursuant to 
this opinion. 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
     Please file the foregoing Opinion. 
 
                                        /s/Theodore A. McKee 
                                                                                    
Circuit Judge 
